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Abstract
A novel study of Brazilian city council efficiency using the non-parametric estimator FDH  (free disposal hull) with bias correction
is presented. In regional terms, study results show a concentration of efficient councils in the southern region. In turn, those in the
northeastern and southeastern regions are among the most ineffective councils. In these latter two regions, most councils could at least
double their outputs while maintaining the same volume of inputs. Regarding population size, for cities with up to 500,000 inhabitants,
more than 60% of city councils could at least quadruple their output. Regarding inefficiencies revealed through non-discretionary vari-
ables (environmental variables), the study results show a correlation between councilor education levels and city council efficiency.
© 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C10, C14, H70
Keywords: Efficiency, City councils; FDH
Resumo
Neste artigo, analisa-se pioneiramente a eficiência das câmaras legislativas municipais brasileiras, a partir do estimador não
paramétrico FDH (Free Disposal Hull), com a respectiva correc¸ão de seu viés. Em termos regionais, os resultados obtidos mostram
grande concentrac¸ão de câmaras eficientes na região Sul. Por sua vez, dentre as câmaras ineficientes, destacam-se as das regiões
Nordeste e Sudeste. De fato, nestas duas regiões, a maioria das câmaras poderia ao menos duplicar a produc¸ão mantendo o mesmo
nível de insumos. Do ponto de vista populacional, nas cidades com até 500.000 habitantes o percentual de câmaras municipais que
podem pelo menos quadruplicar seu produto é maior do que 60%. Em relac¸ão à explicac¸ão das ineficiências por meio de variáveis
não discricionárias (variáveis ambientais), indica-se que quanto maior for o grau de escolaridade média dos vereadores, maior é a
eficiência da câmara legislativa onde atuam.
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reserved.
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.  Introduction
In the period prior to Real Plan implementation in Brazil, which was marked by high inflation rates, applied
conomics literature was heavily focused on issues of inflation. With the advent of price stability and consequent
evenue losses due to seigniorage, concerns over public spending expansion grew significantly.
With the start of the floating exchange regime, which increased Brazilian public debt by approximately 18% points of
he GDP, the Brazilian Government reluctantly initiated fiscal adjustments. Annual primary surplus targets were 3.75%
f GDP from 1999 to 2002, 4.25% of GDP from 2003 to 2007, and 3.8% of GDP for 2008. Throughout this period of
scal adjustment, debates between Brazilian experts on increased public financing of public spending intensified.
Tax burdens were increased to fulfil primary surplus goals and initiate public spending expansion. As tax collection
evels rose, it became evident that economic growth would soon be compromised. In turn, public spending cuts were
roposed as a means of alleviating tax burdens.
As it is difficult to change the allocation of public expenditures in Brazil, i.e., public spending for free allocation
s limited,1 public spending improvements were suggested. In microeconomic terms, this can be translated as follows:
ffering more public services (products) with the same inputs (labor, equipment, etc.).
Consequently, numerous Brazilian applied economics studies have empirically measured issues of public spending
fficiency to promote effective public spending. Evaluations of several segments of the Brazilian public sector have
een conducted in various empirical studies.2
Most, or perhaps all, of these studies3 conduct efficiency analyses of public organizations related to executive
ranches. However, it is critical to not only assess executive branch performance, but also legislative and judiciary4
erformance.
While numerous studies have evaluated local executive power at the municipal scale,5 none have examined the
fficiency of local legislative production, despite the fact that city councils implement local public policies and thus
nact effective (or ineffective) internal policies and incentives.
To address this gap, we examine local legislative production efficiency through a study of the 2005 city council
ensus using the Interlegis platform. From census data, product and input vectors are built to determine production
lans for city councils based on microeconomic theory.
After city council production plans are established, council efficiency scores are determined using econometric
ethods. We then show whether alleged council inefficiencies are attributable to non-discretionary variables, which are
dentified based on the Interlegis census, FINBRA (a report produced by the National Treasury Secretariat concerning
razilian municipality expenditures and revenues) and IPEADATA.
Therefore, this article has two specific goals. We first determine which councils more efficiently allocate public
esources by region and population size. From proposed production plans, we thus produce city council efficiency
ankings by region and population size.
Using city council efficiency scores obtained, we perform a regression analysis to determine specific areas of city
ouncil inefficiency. For this regression, explanatory variables used are non-discretionary, environmental variables,6
nd the explained variable is a vector that includes only inefficient council scores.We also investigate whether city council inefficiency is attributable to councilor education levels. Ferraz and Finan
2008) noted that more highly educated politicians exhibit superior legislative performance. Thus, it is hypothesized
1 For example, in 2003, according to a technical study conducted by the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management/Federal Budget Secretariat
Ministério do Planejamento, Orc¸amento e Gestão/Secretaria de Orc¸amento Federal; Brasil, 2003), only roughly 11% of Union expenditures were
reely allocated (discretionary).
2 See Marinho (2003), Gasparini and Melo (2004), Souza Júnior and Gasparini (2006), Santos et al. (2007), Ribeiro (2008) and Arvate et al.
2008).
3 Throughout our review of existing literature, we found no articles that estimate the efficiency of public organizations of Brazilian legislative
uthority.
4 Throughout our review of existing literature, we found only three studies that evaluate Brazilian judiciary organization member efficiency: Sousa
nd Schwengber (2005,2007) and Yeung and Azevedo (2009).
5 It is understood that, when assessing Municipality Participation Fund (Fundo de Participac¸ão do Município – FPM) expenditure efficiency, this
oncerns municipal executive branch efficiency in FPM resource spending.
6 Environmental variables include those not presented to production process participants during the study period.
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that: more highly educated councilors make more legislative decisions (law approvals and propositions), decreasing
inefficiency.
In addition to this introduction, this article includes four sections. The flowing section elaborates on concepts of
efficiency and production and on indicators used to determine efficiency scores and environmental variable coefficients.
In Section 3, features of the Interlegis census, production plan, and environmental variables used for the efficiency
analysis are described. Section 4 presents the study results. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and avenues for
future research.
2.  Efﬁciency  analysis
2.1.  Features  of  ﬁrm  theory
This study examines and comparatively analyzes production processes applied within firms,7 henceforth represented
by city councils. Various methods can be used to compare city councils based on production process outcomes.
These methods generally differ based on measures produced, required data, and “decision maker” economic
behaviors. Hence, production frontier estimations only require data relating to inputs and products. Other methods,
however, require data on input or product prices or hypotheses on production unit economic behaviors involving profit
maximization or cost minimization.
As public policies are not primarily designed to generate profits, it would not be appropriate to ascertain efficiency
scores based on the profit function. Additionally, it is not appropriate to assume, in the specific case of Brazilian
city councils, that the objective function is to minimize costs, although this may be desirable from a social welfare
perspective.
Therefore profit and cost function methodologies for calculating city council efficiency scores are discarded, and the
production frontier is used instead. This approach has two advantages: (i) only data on inputs consumed and products
generated through production are needed, (ii) it is not necessary to impose economic behaviors (for maximization or
minimization) on city councils.
2.2.  Obtaining  efﬁciency  scores
Using this production frontier approach, it is necessary to calculate city council efficiency scores to conduct
comparisons. Production plan efficiency (x, y) can be defined as:
λ(x,  y) =  sup{λ  : (x,  λy) ∈  T  }. (1)
A production plan (x, y) is thus considered efficient if λ(x, y) = 1. In this case, efficiency is defined based on the
product of fixed x. It is also possible to define production plan efficiency (x, y) using:
θ(x,  y) =  inf{θ  : (θx,  y) ∈  T  }.  (2)
In (2), regarding inputs, a production plan is efficient if θ(x,  y) =  1. From these definitions, it can be concluded that
efficiency analyses require information on technology (T) or on the production frontier (∂T  ).
2.3.  Estimation  of  efﬁciency  scores
Once the use of the production frontier approach has been justified and a means of calculating city council efficiency
scores has been established,8 a council efficiency score estimation approach must be selected. At least two theoretical
approaches to efficiency frontier estimation are presented in the existing literature: parametric and non-parametric
methods.
In the parametric approach, a functional form for technology T  is defined a priori, i.e., it is assumed that the correct
specification of technology is known. However, if the functional form adopted is not correct, results produced will
7 Information on firm theory can be found in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
8 For the purposes of applying firm theory to the public sector, productive units, firms and city councils are treated as synonymous terms in this
article.
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e econometrically inconsistent. In turn, in the non-parametric approach, an a priori specification of a functional
echnological form is not needed.
Because technology T  is unknown in the present study, we estimated efficiency scores using a non-parametric
pproach.9 Despite being biased, non-parametric DEA  (Data Envelopment Analysis) and FDH  methods do not present
roblems of inconsistency.10
Though Brazilian empirical studies have not typically used the DEA  or FDH  based on their respective statistical
roperties,11 these two methods already offer such properties. DEA  and FDH  statistical properties were developed by
ijbels et al. (1999) and Park et al. (2000), respectively. It should be emphasized that DEA  statistical properties were
eveloped only for bivariate environments, i.e., for production plans containing inputs and products.
The DEA  and FDH  differ in that only the former requires convexity.12 Silva et al. (2007) showed that both methods
resent unique advantages and limitations in estimating efficiency scores. The authors thus recommend a simultaneous
se of both to increase the reliability of results obtained. Thus, the two estimation methods should be viewed as
omplementary.
However, in this study, statistical properties of nonparametric methods are required. Thus, to build confidence
ntervals and obtain reliable statistical significance values of estimated efficiency scores, only the FDH13 is used, as it
llows for the use of these production plan properties with multiple inputs and products.14
.3.1.  FDH  – free  disposal  hull
Production frontiers estimated from the FDH  method do not impose convexity restrictions, but an assumption of
ree Disposal. This assumption claims that it is always possible to add input units without sacrificing production.
ather, additional inputs can be transferred or eliminated without cost. Thus, using this method, one can estimate
rontiers with constant, increasing or decreasing scale returns.
Using a random sample XN =  {(xi, yi)}i=1,2,...,N as the set of inputs and products belonging to a certain technology,
s long as real production is unknown, the production frontier estimation via FDH  is given by:
TFDH =
⋃
(xi,yi)∈XN
{(x,  y) ∈  R  +  p  × R  +  q  : y  ≤  yi,  x  ≥  xi} (3)
When estimating the frontier using (3), the input or product is occasionally fixed. Consider P(x) the set of products
hat can be produced by x. Taking x0 as fixed: ˆP(x0) =  {y  : (x0,  y) ∈  TFDH }. Taking y0 as fixed: ˆL(y0) =  {x  : (x,  y0) ∈
FDH }. In turn, one can estimate the efficiency score for a particular city council department (x0, y0) relative to the
rontier TFDH.
As noted above, it is possible to obtain efficiency scores from both in terms of inputs and products. However, in
his study, efficiency scores are obtained only in terms of products because our analysis assumes flexibility in product
ncrease and decrease, but not for inputs. This point is discussed further in the results section.
Regarding products, it is possible to use the FDH method to define an estimator λFDH to obtain the efficiency score
f a given city council department (x0, y0) relative to the frontier TFDH:
λFDH (x0,  y0) =  sup{λ  : (x0,  λy0) ∈ TFDH }, λ  ≥  1 (4)
This estimator locates the maximum product for all city council departments that use inputs that are less than or
qual to those of the evaluated city council. When λ  = 1, the examined city council department meets the production
9 Parametric methods, as described by Tannuri-Pianto et al. (2009), could also have been applied.
10 For more information on statistical properties of the DEA and FDH estimators, see Gijbles (1999) and Park et al. (2000), respectively.
11 An exception is Silva et al. (2007), which uses both the DEA and FDH and considers their statistical and econometric properties.
12 The convexity hypothesis, in turn, prevents the estimated production frontier from the DEA from increasing scale returns. Only decreasing and
onstant scale returns are allowed in the case of the DEA.
13 It is not the FDH that is used in the analysis, but a version that corrects the FDH estimator bias called the C-FDH, as shown below.
14 The DEA estimator developed in Gijbles (1999) cannot be used for production plans with multiple inputs and products, which is the case for
his study. Even in the case of the DEA, it is possible to construct confidence intervals using bootstrap; however, we not only construct confidence
ntervals, but also make use of statistical properties of the FDH estimator, allowing one to correct its bias.
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frontier. In accordance with expression (3), assuming the size of input and product vectors p  and q, respectively, the
FDH efficiency score estimator algorithm relative to frontier TFDH is:
λFDH (x0,  y0) =  max
i:xi≤x
min
1≤j≤q
Y
j
i
y
j
0
(5)
This FDH  algorithm is designed to determine an efficiency score of λFDH among various city council product ratios
by comparing examined city councils with all others using the same or fewer inputs, producing λFDH relative to the
maximum product.15
2.3.2.  FDH  estimator  and  corrected  FDH  estimator  (C-FDH)  properties16
After defining λFDH estimator options, we examined estimator properties in view of our study objectives. When
the FDH method is applied, it is assumed that the constructed technological frontier TFDH is the actual technology T.
Therefore, according to Park et al. (2000), supposing TFDH ⊆  T  , λFDH (x,  y) ≤  λ(x,  y) is obtained.
This implies that λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≥  0, which in probabilistic terms can be written as follows: P(λ(x,  y) −
λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) =  0,  ∀z  ≤  0 In other words, P(λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) for z  > 0. In turn, the following equation
can be used:
P(λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) =  1 −  P(λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y) >  z) (6)
It is possible to manipulate Eq. (6) based on Eqs. (7)–(9) to obtain Eq. (10) based on an assumption of independent
observations:
P(λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) =  1 −  P(λFDH (x,  y) <  λ(x,  y) −  z) (7)
P(λ(x, y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) =  1 −  P
(
max
i:xi≤x
min
1≤j≤q
Y
j
i
y
j
0
<  λ(x,  y) −  z
)
(8)
P(λ(x, y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) =  1 −
[
P
{
min
1≤j≤m
Y
j
i
y
j
0
<  λ(x,  y) −  z ou  xi >  x
}]
(9)
P(λ(x, y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) =  1 −  [1 −  P(xi ≤  x  e yij ≥  λ(x,  y)j −  zyj)]
N (10)
In Eq. (10), one can observe consistency in estimator λFDH(x,y), i.e., P(λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y) ≤  z) →  1 when
N →  ∞,  ∀z >  0. From this equation and other theoretical manipulations, Park et al. (2000) showed that the difference
between the true efficiency score (λ) and FDH  estimator (λFDH) follows a Weibull  asymptotic distribution:
λ(x,  y) −  λFDH (x,  y)∼Weibull(Nμp+q, p  +  q) (11)
In Eq. (11), μ  should be estimated based on data. After using the Weibull distribution to estimate μ, Park et al.
(2000) determined the estimator λFDH bias and obtained the following estimator that corrects this bias17:
λFDH−C(x,  y) =  λFDH (x,  y) −  c1μˆ−1n−1/p+q (12)
As a result, by means of estimator μˆ, it is possible to obtain unbiased efficiency scores and to construct confidence
intervals for these scores from percentiles of the Weibull distribution, forming the following confidence interval:
[λFDH (x,  y),  λFDH (x,  y) +  μˆ−1n−1/p+qz1−α] (13)
In (13), zα =  (−log(1 −  α))(1/p+q), where α  is the level of significance. Therefore, using Eq. (11), it is possible
to measure FDH  efficiency score statistical significance by way of a known probability distribution (Weibull). This
approach differs from the DEA  method, for which, in the case of production plans with multiple inputs and products,
confidence intervals are determined strictly via bootstrap.
15 In the present study, we apply the FDH standard estimation procedure (correcting for inconsistency, as noted in the following section), and we
do not correct outliers, as described in Cazals et al. (2002).
16 Based on Martins-Filho (2008).
17 c1 = Γ ((p + q + 1)/(p + q)), where Γ is the Gamma function and c1 is the first point in the Weibull distribution.
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.4.  Environmental  variable  coefﬁcient  estimation
In theory, from an econometric perspective, this article employs a two-step procedure. First, relative efficiency is
easured. Second, a regression of the efficiency score against different variables from those used in the first stage
s performed. These variables are called non-discretionary, environmental or exogenous variables of the production
rocess.
The objective of this procedure is to explain obtained inefficiencies while emphasizing that such explanations
environmental variables) do not technically form the production plan because they are exogenous to the production
rocess. Rather, they do not account for decision maker choices, i.e., they are non-discretionary variables.
In empirical applications of this two-step procedure, several models had already been used in the second stage, such
s censored models (Tobit) and lognormal models. According to Simar and Wilson (2007), these models cannot be
pplied in the second stage because nonparametric estimators (DEA  and FDH) are serially correlated.
In fact, disruptions to frontier observations change estimated efficiency values for other observations. Hence, if the
econd stage is estimated using Tobit, the conventional inference is inconsistent.18 To correct this inconsistency, Simar
nd Wilson (2007) presented two algorithms that use the bootstrap  procedure.
The first algorithm corrects second-stage inference inconsistency but does not address non-parametric estimator
ias. The second algorithm is more complete as it also addresses non-parametric estimator (DEA  or FDH) bias. Because
he FDH  estimator used in this article already addresses bias, environmental variable coefficients were estimated using
he first algorithm.
For the first algorithm, estimation involves the following steps:
. When using observation data (xi, yi, zi) where z  is an environmental variable, ˆθi = ˆθ(xi, yi.ψFDH )∀i  =  1,  . .  ., n  is
calculated;
. The maximum likelihood method is used to obtain an estimate ˆβ of β  and an estimation of σˆε of σε in truncated
regression ˆθi in Zi using m  < n observations, where ˆθi >  1;
. Steps i to iii involve repeated L  times to obtain a bootstrap  set of estimations A  =  {( ˆβ∗, σˆ∗ε )b}
L
b=1:
i. For each observation (i  =  1,  . . ., m), remove εi from the normal distribution N(0, σˆ2ε ), truncated to the left (1 −  Zi ˆβ);
i. For each i =  1,  .  . ., m, compute ˆθ∗i =  Zi ˆβ +  εi;
i. Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of ˆθi on Ci, producing estimations of
( ˆβ∗, σˆ∗ε );
. Use bootstrap  values calculated in step iii and original estimations ˆβ and σˆε to construct confidence intervals for
each element of β  and σε. Suppose that the intention is to estimate βj , the j-th element of β, which is estimated
from ˆβj , the j-th element of ˆβ.
If the distribution of ( ˆβj −  βj) is known, it is trivial to find aα,  bα values such that Pr(−bα ≤  ( ˆβj −  βj) ≤  −aα) =
 −  α  for some α, 0 < α  <1, such as α  = 0.05. Because the distribution of ( ˆβj −  βj) is unknown, the j-th element of ˆβ can
e used to find a∗α,  b∗α such that Pr(−bα ≤  ( ˆβ∗j −  β∗j ) ≤  −aα) ≈  1 −  α, improving the approximation when L  →  ∞.
hen replacing a∗α,  b∗α with aα,  bα, an estimation of confidence intervals given by
⌊
ˆβj +  a∗α, ˆβj +  b∗α
⌋
is generated.
The final issue to discuss with respect to environmental variable coefficient estimation is related to the number of
eplications, L, needed to construct confidence intervals. Simar and Wilson (2007) recommend using 2000 replications,
nd this approach is followed in the present study.
.  Data  descriptionOur use of efficiency and production frontiers and indicators for obtaining efficiency scores and legislative
ity council environmental variable coefficients have been presented and justified. This section presents general
18 This same statement applies for second stage estimations made through the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model because efficiency scores
stimated using the FDH-C technique (employed as the dependent variable in the second stage) are serially correlated in an unknown manner, which
an often lead to OLS estimator inconsistency.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Number of
observations
Min. Max. Mean SD*
Interlegis census variables not used in the efﬁciency analysis
Respondent mean length of service 4728 3.00 32.50 8.44 6.66
Percentage of female councilors 4920 0.0% 100.0% 12.9% 11.7%
Average councilor age 4599 23 67 42.32 4.54
Percentage of male councilors 4920 0.0% 100.0% 87.1% 11.7%
Mean number of terms in office 4788 1.00 6.00 1.90 0.50
Percentage of female civil servants 4837 0.0% 100.0% 50.2% 23.2%
Percentage of male civil servants 4837 0.0% 100.0% 49.8% 23.2%
Average civil servant age 4351 23.00 67.00 35.84 6.21
Mean civil servant education level (years of study) 4549 4.00 17.00 11.28 1.88
Percentage of personnel cost relative to the total for
the chamber
3768 0.00% 100.00% 53.46% 27.23%
Percentage of maintenance cost relative to the total
for the city council
3768 0.00% 96.26% 19.69% 15.41%
Variables used in the explanation of inefﬁciency (environmental variables)
Mean councilor education level (years of study) 4582 2.00 17.00 9.75 2.21
GDP per capita 2162 1427.21 100,763.77 8441.18 8038.33
Cost per councilor 2162 711.11 1,424,764.42 68,424.96 103,885Source: 1◦ LEGISLATIVE CENSUS 2005-SENADO-INTERLEGIS, IBGE and STN/FINBRA.
characteristics of the Interlegis census and of environmental variables used and describes the two products and six
inputs applied in this study.
3.1.  General  characteristics  of  the  Interlegis  census  and  of  environmental  variables
The database used in this study covers all city councils. These data were drawn from the first legislative census,
which was conducted in 2005 by the Interlegis Special Secretariat, an agency affiliated with the Federal Senate. The
census survey includes 10 sections focusing on issues such as council technological and physical infrastructure, civil
servant and of parliamentarian education levels, and council legislative and financial capacities.
Most census questions provide two additional answer options: “I don’t know” or “no answer”. These entries were
eliminated from descriptive data shown in Table 1 and from our efficiency analyses of city council production plans,
as they were treated as “missing” values.
To familiarize the reader with the Interlegis census database, descriptive statistics of the first city council census
are presented in Table 1. Table 1 also lists variables cataloged in the FINBRA and IPEADATA, which were used to
explain inefficiency scores.
To obtain numerical data, categorical variable manipulations of the Interlegis census were conducted. For instance,
the variable for council servant age, which is presented in this census as the number of people for each range, is instead
presented as a mean value for each age range.
This mean value was obtained from the midpoint of the age range weighted by the number of people (relative to the
total) for the corresponding range. Values for the following categorical variables presented in Table 1 were obtained
following this approach: mean councilor length of service and mean councilor age.
The following rubric based years of study was used to determine mean education levels: incomplete primary
education, four years, completed primary education, eight years, incomplete secondary education, 10 years, secondary
education, 11 years, incomplete higher education, 13 years, completed higher education, 15 years, completed latu
sensu or stricto  sensu  graduate program, 17 years.
According to Table 1, on average, 87.1% of the councilors are male, are of 42 years of age and have an incomplete
secondary education. The councilors have served, on average, for 1.9 terms in city council. For city council servants,
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he gender discrepancy is much smaller, and women are the majority, on average, the female percentage is 50.2%.
hese civil servants are, on average, 35 years of age and have a complete secondary education.
Regarding to city council expenditures (Table 1), personnel costs (relative to total expenditures) reached 53.5%,
.e., relative to all city council resources. In turn, maintenance costs (relative to all city council resources) account for
pproximately 19.7%.
Regarding environmental variables, only the mean councilor education level was exclusively obtained from the
nterlegis census. GDP per  capita  values are cataloged in the IPEADATA. In turn, the ‘Expense per Councilor’
ariable was calculated from two sources: the number of councilors based on the Interlegis census, and city council
xpenditures taken from the 2004 FINBRA report based on the legislative function category.
The mean councilor education level variable was used following Ferraz and Finan (2008). These authors found that
ore educated politicians exhibit better legislative performance, and thus it is anticipated that this variable exogenous
o legislative procedures per se could improve city council efficiency.
GDP per  capita  values are used to test whether city councils are more or less efficient depending on municipality
ealth. In turn, costs per councilor (total city council expenses divided by the number of councilors) are used to assess
hether public spending allocated to city council departments affect efficiency.
In addition to these three environmental variables, dummies  were used for each Brazilian macro-region (the northern,
ortheastern, southern, southeastern and midwestern regions) to explain inefficiencies. To support our estimations, a
ummy for the southern region was excluded. Thus, for example, the northeastern region dummy  coefficient captures
o what degree, on average, city councils are more or less effective depending on the sign of the coefficient relative
o the southern region. The goal is to determine whether there are effects idiosyncratic to the northeastern region that
ender it more or less efficient than the southern region.
.2.  Production  plans:  products  and  inputs
The Interlegis census was employed based on the assumption that city council products are the result of council
nputs. Therefore, numerical variables that reflect city council production plans were selected, i.e., council products
nd inputs.
The following six inputs were used: number of councilors, number of civil servants, number of telephones, number of
ax machines, available Internet connection and legislative system computerization. In the case of legislative production,
wo products were considered: the number of bills presented by parliamentarians and the total number of bills approved
y councils of a parliamentary, executive or popular nature.19
Some census questions were not included in the council production plans. Information regarding the number of
omputers in each city council department were not used because these data were presented in ranges.
Technological resources available to employees are central to an analysis of legislative production, and the number
f available computers is a good proxy in this regard. However, transforming such information (the range of the number
f computers) into numerical data would affect the results considerably. The arbitrary midpoint of each range (as input)
ould have significantly altered the efficiency scores.
In Chart 1, the number of computers is shown based on ranges used in the census. It should be noted that 78% of
he municipalities fall within the first range (city councils with one to five computers).
Another potential variable of council input that could also serve as proxy for technological resources available to
mployees is information regarding the number of computers connected to the Internet. However, because no answer
as given for this variable for more than 50% of the city councils examined, its use was impractical.
Given these impossibilities, to determine technological resources available to city council staff, two variables were
mployed: available Internet connection and legislative system computerization. Internet connection is a binary variable
ith only two possible answers: available or not available.
For legislative system computerization, we aim to identify whether legislative processes, administrative processes
r parliamentary activities involve computerized procedures (systems). This input was constructed based on three
19 In Brazil, the two major responsibilities of a legislative council are to legislate and supervise. Thus, it was only possible to identify a legislative
unction product. No Interlegis census variable addresses the supervisory function.
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items. A weight of one was assigned for each system identified. In this case, city council scores range from zero (no
computerized systems) to three (all systems are computerized).
Regarding product data, bills authored by the executive or by popular initiative were not used because they do not
originate from city council inputs. Conversely, as parliamentary, executive and popular bill approvals depend directly
on council inputs, the number of bills approved is considered a council product.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables used as inputs and products for the 3878 city councils used to
obtain efficiency scores.
In Table 2, the total of 3878 city councils arises from the elimination of all councils holding any one of the two
products equal to zero and all the councils in which the variable number of councilors is less than nine, which is
impossible, according to the article 29 of the Constitution.
Table 3 list the input and product variables under four population ranges. On range 1, are listed the city councils
of municipalities with up to 20,000 inhabitants. On range 2, the councils located in municipalities that have between
20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. On range 3, those located in municipalities that have between 100,000 and 500,000
inhabitants. On range 4, are the councils in municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants.
Table 2
Inputs and products used in the estimation.
Variables Min. Max. Mean SD*
Inputs
Number of councilors 9 50 9.30 1.42
Number of civil servants 0 1472 14.16 40.72
Number of telephones 0 221 4.20 10.22
Number of fax machines 0 96 0.95 2.30
Internet connection (binary variable)* 0 1 0.83 0.38
Legislative system computerization 0 3 1.61 1.21
Products
Number of bills presented by parliamentarians 1 620 11.49 28.48
Number of approved bills** 1 806 29.26 32.36
Source: 1st LEGISLATIVE CENSUS 2005-SENADO-INTERLEGIS.
* Obs. Zero denotes that a connection to the Internet is not available and 1(one) means available connection.
** It is the sum of the approved bills of parliamentary, popular and executive origin.
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Table 3
Inputs and products used in the estimation, according to population ranges.
Variables Range Min. Max. Mean SD*
Number of councilors Range 1 9 19 9.01 0.22
Range 2 9 14 9.25 0.47
Range 3 10 30 12.69 2.53
Range 4 19 50 23.63 8.05
Number of telephones Range 1 0 64 2.12 2.67
Range 2 0 78 5.58 7.01
Range 3 0 193 24.51 31.57
Range 4 0 221 40.44 64.48
Number of fax machines Range 1 0 5 0.73 0.48
Range 2 0 14 0.92 0.74
Range 3 0 50 3.37 6.20
Range 4 0 96 12.94 25.09
Connection to the Internet (binary variable)* Range 1 0 1 0.79 0.40
Range 2 0 1 0.89 0.31
Range 3 0 1 0.92 0.27
Range 4 0 1 0.75 0.45
Computerization of legislative system Range 1 0 3 1.52 1.22
Range 2 0 3 1.77 1.16
Range 3 0 3 2.08 1.03
Range 4 0 3 2.44 0.81
Number of civil servants Range 1 0 107 6.44 5.66
Range 2 0 226 18.32 17.92
Range 3 0 1472 80.52 132.03
Range 4 0 712 302.75 233.97
Number of bills submitted by the parliamentarians Range 1 1 170 6.24 10.11
Range 2 1 612 13.96 25.41
Range 3 2 400 60.03 63.67
Range 4 24 620 196.75 179.31
Number of approved bills** Range 1 1 260 24.33 21.66
Range 2 1 392 34.09 32.83
Range 3 5 806 68.43 78.81
Range 4 31 500 104.38 114.94
Source: 1st LEGISLATIVE CENSUS 2005-SENADO-INTERLEGIS.
* Obs.: Zero means that Internet connection is not available and one denotes connection availability.
** The sum of approved bills of parliamentary, popular and executive origin. Population ranges are distributed as follows: range 1 = municipalities
of up to 20,000 inhabitants (n = 3654), range 2 = municipalities of between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (n = 1241), range 3 = municipalities of
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cetween 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants (n = 203), range 4 = municipalities with over 500,000 inhabitants (n = 32).
Table 3 shows that the mean values are increasing in all variables. In other words, higher local population size means
reater quantity of inputs and products of city councils. This finding shows that the division in these population ranges
ill allow the analysis of the results (efficiency scores) in a more homogeneous way.
Given this fact, it is worth mentioning that the FDH estimator only compares units of inputs in equal or lesser
mount of those used by the comparison unit, i.e., the efficiency scores are obtained only among “comparable” units.
y way of illustration, a chamber that has 20 councilors is compared only with a chamber that has 20 or fewer
ouncilors.
A number of results presented in Table 3 must be highlighted. In 2005, Internet connection was available in
2% of legislative councils of municipalities with a population size of between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants,
hich is a higher percentage than that of cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants (75%). In turn, legislative system
omputerization is much more prevalent in municipalities with over 500,000 inhabitants relative to other municipalities.
Table 4 presents city council production plan products and inputs from a regional standpoint.
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Table 4
Inputs and products used in the estimation by macro region.
Variables Region Min. Max. Mean SD*
Number of councilors Northern 9 18 9.22 0.83
Northeastern 9 24 9.28 1.31
Southeastern 9 50 9.41 1.86
Southern 9 36 9.24 1.22
Midwestern 9 21 9.14 0.82
Number of civil servants Northern 0 338 15.78 26.31
Northeastern 0 674 14.61 34.84
Southeastern 0 1472 16.55 56.24
Southern 0 712 10.50 30.80
Midwestern 0 350 12.44 25.13
Number of telephones Northern 0 32 2.75 4.66
Northeastern 0 172 3.27 7.42
Southeastern 0 221 5.62 14.37
Southern 0 150 4.20 9.38
Midwestern 0 37 3.79 4.90
Number of fax machines Northern 0 14 0.66 0.96
Northeastern 0 35 0.68 1.43
Southeastern 0 50 1.25 2.49
Southern 0 96 1.05 3.37
Midwestern 0 3 0.82 0.47
Internet connection (binary variable)* Northern 0 1 0.56 0.50
Northeastern 0 1 0.67 0.47
Southeastern 0 1 0.94 0.24
Southern 0 1 0.94 0.24
Midwestern 0 1 0.91 0.29
Legislative system computerization Northern 0 3 1.86 1.22
Northeastern 0 3 1.44 1.31
Southeastern 0 3 1.70 1.13
Southern 0 3 1.61 1.15
Midwestern 0 3 1.68 1.17
Number of bills submitted by parliamentarians Northern 1 81 6.92 10.04
Northeastern 1 300 8.64 16.58
Southeastern 1 620 15.83 37.47
Southern 1 612 11.16 32.41
Midwestern 1 160 11.26 21.99
Number of approved bills** Northern 1 392 17.43 28.23
Northeastern 1 400 14.98 17.97
Southeastern 1 500 31.78 31.29
Southern 1 806 47.77 38.42
Midwestern 1 295 31.04 33.14
Source: 1st LEGISLATIVE CENSUS 2005-SENADO-INTERLEGIS.
* Obs.: Zero denotes that Internet connection is not available and one denotes connection availability.** The sum of approved bills of parliamentary, popular and executive origin.
Regional results presented in Table 4 show that municipalities in the southern region employ, on average, far fewer
servants (roughly 10.5) than northern, northeastern and southeastern municipalities, with the latter employing the most
servants (16.55) on average. This table also presents interesting results on legislative production.Parliamentarians in the southeastern region submitted on average 83% more bills than those of the northeastern
region and 129% more than those of the northern region. Regarding the number of approved bills, southern region
city councils are, on average, 174% and 219% more productive than those of the northern and northeastern regions,
respectively.
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.  Analysis  of  results
Here, we present an analysis of efficiency scores obtained using the estimator λFDH-C, which corrects the FDH
stimator, and (estimated) coefficients of environmental variables that explain alleged city council inefficiencies.
owever, before presenting this analysis, we clarify three issues.
First, our efficiency analysis is based on products because, for city councils, product increase and decrease flexibility
xists, but not in the case of inputs. Increased council efficiency due to decreased input is unlikely because various legal
echanisms prevent the dissolution of permanent civil servants and/or councilors. Furthermore, political variables also
xplain the rigidity of aforementioned inputs.
Second, we compare estimated efficiency scores based on population size and region (using the same four ranges
escribed in the previous section).
Third, for the purpose of clarity, the λFDH-C estimator is reversed in the efficiency score analysis. From this inversion,
btained scores were divided into five intervals. The first four are organized into quartiles and the latter represents the
ost efficient councils (inverse of λFDH-C greater than or equal to one). According to Eq. (13), the λFDH estimator
nderestimates efficiency, which is corrected via λFDH-C. This underestimation makes it possible to find an inverse of
FDH-C that is greater than one.
In our estimation of efficiency scores, correcting the estimator λFDH bias changed the values ranging from one to
oughly 1.4 into a number less than or equal to one when λFDH-C was obtained. This made the inverse of λFDH-C greater
han or equal to one. In addition, by correcting this bias in conjunction with its confidence interval, λFDH scores ranging
rom one to approximately 1.4 are statistically equal. Thus, the confidence interval with the most efficient councils was
efined as the one with scores (of the inverse of λFDH-C) greater than or equal to one.
Following these considerations, Chart 2 ranks inverse of efficiency scores λFDH-C with respective confidence inter-
als, i.e., with lower and upper bounds obtained in accordance with Eq. (14) at a significance level of 5% (α  = 0.05) (a
5% confidence interval).
23 Although the scale presented in Chart 2 is unclear, we confirm that estimator values fall within the confidence interval as anticipated.
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Table 5
Relative frequency of efficiency scores by interval.
Region Between 0 and 0.25 Between 0.25 and 0.50 Between 0.50 and 0.75 Between 0.75 and one Above one
Northern 10% 3% 4% 3% 1%
Northeastern 33% 26% 16% 19% 15%
Southeastern 31% 34% 24% 26% 17%
Southern 18% 26% 51% 47% 58%
Midwestern 8% 10% 5% 5% 8%
Total 2880 534 192 78 194
Table 6
Relative frequency of efficiency scores by macro-region.
Region Between 0 and 0.25 Between 0.25 and 0.50 Between 0.50 and 0.75 Between 0.75 and one Above one Total
Northern 91% 6% 2% 1% 1% 309
Northeastern 82% 12% 3% 1% 3% 1162
Southeastern 76% 16% 4% 2% 3% 1178
Southern 57% 16% 11% 4% 13% 903
Midwestern 74% 17% 3% 1% 5% 326Chart 2 plots efficiency scores (accompanied by respective confidence intervals) along a monotonically increasing
curve. Hence, from a statistical perspective, it is possible to conclude that based on a 95% confidence interval, higher
(smaller) scores are higher (smaller). For example,20 a score of 0.45 is significantly greater than 0.2.
In addition to efficiency score monotonicity, it should be noted that FDH estimator corrections changed efficiency
inferences obtained using the FDH estimator. Several councils considered inefficient through the FDH analysis were
rendered effective after this bias correction. This demonstrates that the λFDH-C estimator more reliably predicts relative
efficiency.
Table 5 presents the results in terms of frequency relative to the total number of city councils in each range of the
inverse based on the corrected FDH estimator, distributed based on macro-regions: northern, northeastern, southeastern,
southern and midwestern. The highest concentration (58%) of efficient city councils is found in the southern region21.
The highest concentration (33%) of least efficient councils is found in the northeastern region, followed closely by the
southeastern region (31%).
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 show that the southern region presents the highest percentages. In other
words, southern municipalities more frequently occupy the production frontier. Additionally, this region includes more
city councils closer to the frontier relative to other regions (47% of all councils with an inverse of λFDH-C scores
between 0.75 and 1).
Fixing rows rather than columns, Table 6 presents complementary information to Table 5. Table 6 presents city
council efficiency scores by region. In each region, the highest concentrations of municipalities fall under lower ranges
of efficiency (0–0.25). Still, proportionately less inefficient councils are concentrated within the southern region (57%).
Furthermore, Table 6 shows that the southern region includes proportionately more efficient councils (13%) relative
to the other regions.
Table 7 presents the relative frequency of city council efficiency scores by population range. For the first three
population ranges, the percentage of city councils with scores of up to 0.25 (i.e., municipalities that can at least
quadruple their product) is greater than 60%. In municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, numerous councils
present efficiency values of zero to 0.25, but this is well below 60%, i.e., approximately 44%.
20 While this may seem numerically impossible, when efficiency scores are estimated without confidence intervals, there is no statistical certainty
that one is different from 1.4, for example.
21 Note that the notion of efficiency is relative, i.e., a council is more or less efficient relative to other councils present in the sample that use equal
or fewer inputs.
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Table 7
Relative frequency of efficiency scores by population range.
Score Range Up to 20,000
inhabitants
Between 20,000
and 100,000
inhabitants
Between 100,000 and
500,000 inhabitants
More than 500,000
inhabitants
Between zero and 0.25 74% 77% 63% 44%
Between 0.25 and 0.50 14% 13% 20% 25%
Between 0.50 and 0.75 5% 4% 7% 6%
Between 0.75 and one 2% 2% 3% 13%
Above one 5% 5% 8% 13%
Total by range 2628 1065 169 16
Table 8
Inefficient city councils: explanation based on environmental variables.
Variables Coefficient Standard deviation P-value
Constant 19.4 5.6 0.00
Mean councilor education level (years of study) −0.97 0.49 0.03
GDP per capita 0.00023 0.00013 0.04
Cost per councilor −0.000026 0.000011 0.01
Dummies
Northern Region 24.3 4.2 0.00
Northeastern Region 22.9 3.1 0.00
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loutheastern Region 8.4 2.7 0.00
idwestern Region 7.8 4.1 0.03
Table 7 shows that municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants account for a larger proportion of efficient
ity councils (13%). When observing a range (of the inverse of λFDH-C) above one, on average, municipalities with
arger populations tend to manage more efficient city councils.
From these findings on the most efficient city councils based on population range, we determine estimated coefficients
f environmental variables used to examine ineffective councils: mean councilor education levels, GDP per  capita,
ost per councilor and dummies  for Brazilian macro-regions.
It should be noted that when estimating environmental coefficients, the regressand was deemed the vector with
fficiency scores λFDH-C and not its inverse and based on only councils below the production frontier, i.e., considering
nly ineffective cameras. In this case, higher values of λFDH-C correlate with a greater degree of municipal city council
nefficiency.
In Table 8, all variables are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In the case of mean councilor
ducation levels, an increase of one year in mean education corresponds with a 0.97 decrease in the λFDH-C score, i.e.,
t decreases inefficiency by 0.97, on average. This result reflects those of Ferraz and Finan (2008),22 who found that
ore highly educated Brazilian councilors present better legislative performance.
Regarding costs per councilor, for which total city council expenses are divided by the number of councilors, an
ncrease of BRL 1 (one real) reduces council inefficiency by 0.000026. Because this is a very small effect, the impact
f increased costs per councilor on city council inefficiency is almost negligible.
With regards to GDP per capita, an increase of BRL 1 (one real) in GDP increases inefficiency by 0.00023. Hence,
n the frontier, wealthier municipalities manage more inefficient councils, according to the proposed production plan.
hus, parliamentarians of richer municipalities tend to propose and approve fewer laws. Though the effect of increasing
DP per capita on inefficiency is small, this result was not expected.
In addition to mean councilor education, councilor cost, and GDP per capita values, dummies  were used for
ach Brazilian macro-region (northern, northeastern, southern, southeastern and midwestern) in the explanation of
22 These authors, who also use the Interlegis census, found that higher wages attract more highly educated councilors, which in turn exhibit stronger
egislative performance.
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inefficiencies. In this case, the dummy for the southern region was excluded to avoid multicollinearity. For example,
the northern region dummy coefficient captures the average degree to which northern region location affects council
efficiency relative to southern positioning.
It is worth noting that a population variable was not included among the set of environmental variables because the
cost per councilor variable, which indirectly includes a standard cost by population range, was already included, as
defined in art. 29, item VI of the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF/88). In addition, two restrictions affect spending
limits and use population ranges as a criterion, thus also serving, albeit indirectly, as a means of population scale
control. The first restriction, found in art. 29, item IV of CF/88, limits the number of councilors by population range.
The second, included in art. 29 of CF/88, limits legislative spending relative to municipality revenues.
In this case, there appears to be a factor idiosyncratic to the southern region that renders city councils more efficient
than those of other regions. This is also true when considering other environmental variables and inputs of the production
plan used to obtain efficiency scores.
From the coefficients obtained, these idiosyncrasies are far more prevalent relative to the northern and northeastern
regions than relative to the southeastern and midwestern regions. Such idiosyncrasies, rooted in institutional, political
and legal factors, may be difficult to measure quantitatively, as they were not captured in either of the two phases of
econometric analysis.
5.  Conclusions
This article presents a novel use of Interlegis census data for examining Brazilian city council efficiency. The most
efficient city councils with regards to legislative production were identified, i.e., the most efficient councils in the
allocation of inputs and products.
Based on a given production plan, this study identified regions where the most efficient councils are located and
considered degrees of efficiency by population range. In addition, by means of environmental variables, this article
provided information on factors (exogenous to legislative procedures per se) that account for city council inefficiencies.
Regionally, the highest concentration of efficient councils is found in the southern region. In turn, the northeastern
and southeastern regions present the greater number of less efficient councils. In the northeastern region, for example,
roughly one-third of councils could at least quadruple their production without a change in inputs.
Regarding population ranges, for municipalities with up to 500,000 inhabitants, the percentage of cameras with
scores equal to or below 0.25 (i.e., municipalities that could at least quadruple their production) is greater than 60%.
With respect to city council inefficiency, an increase in mean councilor education or in costs per councilor decreases
council inefficiency. However, the effect of costs per councilor on inefficiency is negligible. In turn, an increase in GDP
per capita increases inefficiency, though this increase is almost negligible.
Regarding inefficiencies due to environmental variables, features idiosyncratic to the southern region render city
councils in this area more efficient than those employed in other regions. These idiosyncrasies may be related to factors
that are difficult to measure quantitatively, i.e., institutional, political and legal factors, as they were not captured in
either of the two phases of econometric analysis.
Additional production plans must be estimated to attain more reliable results on alleged city council inefficiencies
using other econometric methodologies.
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